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Abstract
Women are often understood to be highly marginalised in typical African customary land 
regimes. The research presented in this article found that in the Acholi region of northern 
Uganda this is not the case. The crisis of land conflict that followed the twenty-year lra 
insurgency and mass rural displacement has seemingly passed, notwithstanding a minimal 
contribution from the formal justice, law and order sector: local state actors as well as clan 
elders are mediating and adjudicating disputes on the basis of custom. However some 
social institutions, in particular traditional marriage, have been deeply affected by displace-
ment and the consequent poverty. In this context, custom appears to be becoming more 
responsive to the needs of women, including those who are divorced or separated. While 
women’s customary land claims are often challenged, they appear to be generally respected 
and supported by communities and those with responsibilities for settling disputes.
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1 Introduction
In March 2013 the Ugandan Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Develop-
ment published a new land policy after a number of years of consultations.1 
1 Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development (mlhud), The Uganda National Land 
Policy (March 2013) pp. 17–18.
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Although as much as 90 per cent of Ugandan land is ‘customary’, the policy 
devotes to this topic only one short chapter. This does, in deference perhaps to 
some 30 years of policy debate, identify some measures to secure customary 
tenure rather than proposing its immediate elimination. However the actual 
steps identified are essentially the individualisation, privatisation and for-
malised tenure that it assumes are the inevitable evolutionary end-point for 
African customary land.2 In the policy, the proposed land title of ‘Customary 
Tenure’ is a stage on the path to freehold registration, and while there is recog-
nition that some lands may be collectively held, the focus is on a type of com-
mons found only in certain regions, neglecting the collective lands found in 
others. It does envision a (currently lacking) formal role for customary leaders 
in the settling of land disputes, though there is no acknowledgement that 
those who carry authority in respect of land management and dispute resolu-
tion might vary in different ethnic regions.3
The policy proposes land law reforms of a kind that represent a regression to 
colonial and early neo-liberal positions from the Land Act of 1998.4 Although 
2 See I. Yngstrom, ‘Women, Wives and Land Rights in Africa: Situating Gender Beyond the 
Household in the Debate Over Land Policy and Changing Tenure Systems’, 30:1 Oxford 
Development Studies (2002) pp. 21–40, for a rejection of evolutionary theories in respect of 
customary land.
3 In the policy’s customary land concerns and proposals, the advocacy of the Land and Equity 
Movement in Uganda (lemu) can be discerned. Cf. e.g., R. Knight et al., Protecting Community 
Lands and Resources: Evidence from Uganda (Namati, lemu and idlo, Kampala, 2014). 
Problems in this and other reports and advocacy literature include referring to ‘northern 
Uganda’ when the custom it refers to is specific to the Lango Sub-region, or even more local. 
lemu’s recommendations follow the late Kenyan jurist Okoth-Ogendo, who on the one hand 
eloquently described how vastly, indeed metaphysically, different African land custom is 
from Western law’s treatment of land as a commodity; but on the other asserted that it can 
be readily codified and incorporated into formal law. lemu similarly seeks the incorporation 
of the customary into the formal system, seeing this as a means to ensure its consistency and 
its respect for women’s constitutional rights. Mahmood Mamdani has provided a partial cri-
tique of lemu’s arguments but also declines to see African, or at least Ugandan, land custom 
as divers and complex. See M. Mamdani, The Contemporary Ugandan Discourse on Customary 
Tenure: Some Theoretical Considerations (Makerere Institute of Social Research, misr 
Working Paper No.13, Kampala, 2013).
4 See A. Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa: From Communal Tenure to Free Markets, 
(Zed Books, London and New York, 2006) on the problems – and neo-liberal politics - of land 
law reform; L. Alden Wily, Governance and Land Relations: A Review of Decentralization of 
Land Administration and Management in Africa, (International Institute for Environment 
and Development (iied), London, 2003) which thoroughly documents the strengths and 
weaknesses of the 1998 Ugandan Land Act.
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the latter has been widely criticised, it has been for the lack of its implementa-
tion and affordability rather than its intentions and substance. Both the Act 
and the Policy have a stated aim to protect women’s constitutional rights to 
equality in respect of customary land. Uganda’s different ethnicities share a 
tradition, identifiable in contemporary custom, of patriarchy; if you ask most 
Ugandans, they will tell you something to the effect that ‘women cannot own 
land’, though this is actually not the case. In respect of formally tenured land, 
women have equal rights to men to buy, sell and own land (although other 
inequalities mean they more rarely do). While in respect of customary land, it 
is essentially the case that individuals of neither gender ‘own’ land, rather 
that the types of claims men and women can make for use of or control over 
land differ.
The findings presented here are intended to address some of the above 
issues. They arise out of work conducted in 2012 under the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Fund (pbf), which commissioned the development of a Land 
Conflict Monitoring and Mapping Tool (lcmmt) for the Acholi sub-region of 
northern Uganda.5 This undertook a comprehensive mapping of land disputes, 
identifying trends within the area most affected by the northern Ugandan con-
flict, the Lord’s Resistance Army (lra) insurgency. This twenty-year conflict 
had led to the eventual displacement of the entire rural population of 
Acholiland (as well as more partial displacement in neighbouring regions), in 
some cases for more than a decade. The appalling internal displaced persons 
(idp) camps eventually emptied after the end of the conflict on Ugandan soil 
in 2006 (it has continued in other countries), but the main exodus from the 
camps was between 2008 and 2010. As the oral records of land claims had been 
thoroughly disrupted and in some cases lost when a large part of a generation 
of elders had died in the camps and boundary markers had sometimes disap-
peared or become unrecognisable, expectations of land-related chaos were 
widespread amongst government and humanitarian agencies overseeing 
return.
Historically, Acholi land customs developed in an environment of extensive 
tracts of open land, some of it used, occupied and managed by communities, 
other parts unused and unoccupied, but perhaps technically part of a polity 
potentially tolerant of settlers.6 Here, the notion of ‘claims’ may have more 
traction than that of ‘rights’, and this complicates the challenge of defining 
5 J. Hopwood and R.R. Atkinson, Final Report: Land Conflict Monitoring and Mapping Tool for 
the Acholi Sub-Region (United Nations Peacebuilding Programme and Human Rights Focus, 
2013).
6 F.K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda (H. M. Stationary Office, London, 1960).
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land disputes, given that a degree of negotiation is inherent in all land occupa-
tion and use. If negotiation is inherently part of land access, then so must be 
argument, and sometimes disagreement or quarrel. The point at which this 
might better be described as a dispute is something that perhaps only those 
engaged in the whole process are equipped to answer. Arguments about land 
within families and clans have probably always been ubiquitous and set about 
with systems for maintaining, and restoring where necessary, normal and har-
monious relations.
The lcmmt research was concerned with those disputes that challenged 
communities, whether through violence or social strife, or which threatened 
individuals or groups with landlessness, or in some other way generated dis-
cord. Rather than risk limiting the potential range of challenges, we asked 
actors at a certain level – Parish – to report on problematic disputes. As these 
were leaders of communities with typically about 5,000 members, we hoped to 
avoid the inclusion of routine arguments that are endemic to the system. The 
spread of responses reporting from around 300 rural parishes suggest that 
respondents interpreted the brief fairly consistently.
As well as general dispute data, the tool collected information on clan distri-
butions in around 70 per cent of the roughly 300 rural parishes in the sub-
region; and detailed descriptions of 1,320 disputes. 202 of these involved 
women or female-headed households as one or both of the principle parties to 
the dispute.7 Further interviews during January 2014 allowed for an update of 
ongoing disputes involving women as principle parties from September 2012.
lcmmt findings showed a steep decline in overall numbers of land disputes 
between October 2011 and September 2012, and high rates of resolution. This 
contradicted assumptions about the scale and trend of land disputes in Acholi 
and the consequent implication that local dispute resolution mechanisms 
were failing. It also found wide variation across Acholi in the communal bodies 
that control customary land. The research reported here seeks to look at issues 
of women’s land security. The approach follows Johan Pottier, who argues that:
7 The descriptions of disputes are not random, but selected by informants, probably on the 
basis that these were the ones they were most familiar with. If so, they are likely to be repre-
sentative. However it is important to note that other factors may have come into play. One 
possibility is that, as dispute resolution actors, some respondents might have avoided or dis-
torted their reports of cases where they had been compromised through bribery, intimida-
tion or had otherwise been involved in an unfair resolution. Overall however, the scale of the 
research means that it offers an interesting and roughly accurate picture of numbers and 
types of disputes significant at parish-level.
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The all important point is that we – analysts and policymakers alike – 
must get beyond the currently popular, but excessively restrictive view 
that women’s customary claims to land are always ‘secondary’ to men’s. 
Without in any way diminishing the severe insecurities that women face, 
it must be recognised that the notion of a gradual weakening or extinction 
of women’s rights in land is by no means inevitable. We must abandon 
such evolutionary thought, and instead pay full attention to the prolifera-
tion of claims and counter-claims that can be made – and are being 
made – in the name of custom. Like the colonial courts, contemporary 
policy arenas that espouse evolutionary models of customary land law are 
missing out on the ongoing dynamic of claims and counterclaims.8
This then is an examination of the claims and counter-claims made by women 
and by those seeking to displace them, usually on the basis of custom. It also 
examines how these claims are put forward and the processes involved in 
deciding them. The descriptions discussed have been provided by community 
leaders responsible for mediating and sometimes adjudicating these claims 
and, as such, offer a perspective on women’s customary land security as it 
stands now.
I argue from these findings that the hybrid local authorities in Acholi are 
largely supportive of a range of kinship and marital claims to land made by 
women. Formal justice processes are not entirely absent, as they are some-
times invoked by those with the resources to do so, but are largely irrelevant as 
the higher courts lack both moral authority and the means to enforce their 
rulings. This has major implications for land policy and law reform.
2 Background
Customary land is, throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa, also communal 
land. However the nature of the communal bodies in control varies substan-
tially and this has significance for how customary land is managed, how its 
practices evolve in relation to external factors, which members of the commu-
nal body have stronger and weaker security of access and what threats they 
face. In Acholi, clans (kaka), as opposed, say, to chiefdoms, extended families 
8 J. Pottier, ‘Customary Land Tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa Today: Meanings and Contexts’, in 
C. Huggins and J. Clover (eds.), From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-
Saharan Africa (African Centre for Technology Studies and the African Security Analysis 
Programme of the Institute for Security Studies, 2006) p. 67.
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or households, have historically been the allocators and guarantors of their 
members’ land ‘rights’, and so it is significant to consider the form they took in 
the past and how that may have changed in the present.
Clans tend to be defined in terms of kinship. In Acholi, clans are, and would 
seem to have long been, something more fluid and complex. As described his-
torically by Crazzolara, Girling and Atkinson, the notion overlapped with, but 
was not identical to that of a village (gang), a physical, geographical entity.9 
While there was a core agnatic lineage group to each clan/village, other resi-
dents included more than just the wives who had married into the clan. 
Refugees from other clans, often related by marriage – ‘in-laws’ – were and are 
a ubiquitous grouping, sometimes settling in a particular part of the village. 
A daughter returning to one of her parental clans with her husband, following 
difficulties of some sort in the husband’s clan/village was and is a common 
scenario. However friends, and immigrants from other clans, tribes and regions 
usually also make up the mix.10
The extent to which these others retain ‘outsider’ identities depends on 
many factors, including the strength of their ties to their clan of origin, whether 
they have integrated well, are good and helpful neighbours, have played an 
active part in clan/village affairs and the length of time or number of genera-
tions they have stayed. In pre-colonial times, this was happening in an environ-
ment where land was abundant, where, up to a point, the clan/village was 
stronger in terms of security if there were more members, and where newcom-
ers brought new ideas, socially and economically.11 This meant that clans/vil-
lages often had good reasons to be inclusive to those who integrated. In some 
parts of Acholi some of these circumstances still apply, though population 
growth during the period of displacement has tended to reduce the perception 
that there is ample land.
Historically, clans were not static entities. As a social unit engaged in a range 
of cooperative activities, including collective farming, and without a strong 
central administrative hierarchy, there was perhaps an optimum size. Villages 
typically had a population of as few as 200 up to several thousand, but typically 
300–400.12 If they grew much larger, they could become unwieldy given the 
9 See J P. Crazzolara, The Lwoo, Vol. 3: Lwoo Traditions (Instituto Missioni Africane, Verona, 
1954); Girling, supra note 6; R. R. Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The Origins of the Acholi 
of Uganda (Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 2010).
10 Atkinson, supra note 9, p. 15.
11 Girling, supra note 6, p. 180 talks of vast areas of unsettled bush, albeit usually conceived 
as hunting grounds specific to a clan or chiefdom, when he was there in the 1950s.
12 Atkinson, supra note 9, p. 76.
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degree of collectivity. Quarrels might also lead to people leaving a clan. Such 
splits within clans/villages might involve individuals leaving on bad terms or 
being expelled, through to extended families leaving by mutual agreement 
with the rest, as pioneers establishing a new branch of the clan in a different 
location.
The resulting entities might be understood by their members to be linked as 
a single lineage/clan/kaka, made up of several sub-clans (doggola), which 
might be localised within a single chiefdom (see below) or spread across more 
than one. Over time, these entities might evolve into distinct clans or remain 
more or less closely linked by some or all of such practices as prohibited inter-
marriage, collective liability for blood money and openness to movement 
between populations. This mobility and flexibility around inclusion has led to 
issues of clan identity, and of ancestral clan land, being complex, changing 
over time, contested and negotiated by clan elders, and today often deeply 
unclear to younger clan members and outsiders.
Clans usually existed within chiefdoms in which spiritual and political 
authority of a kind was held by a royal chief [rwot moo], himself head of a royal 
(lo-kal) clan. As Girling puts it:
Although the Rwot was the political head of the domain, he had no coer-
cive machinery for enforcing his decisions. It may even be doubted 
whether he had decisions of his own which he wished to enforce; the 
policy of the domain was the result of the reconciliation of the separate 
interests of the constituent village-lineages.13
Each pre-colonial chiefdom controlled a substantial geographical area and was 
made up of a royal clan and a variable number of commoner (lo-bong) clans. 
When a clan split as described above, the new entity might seek land in the 
same chiefdom or travel to a different chiefdom and request the chief to grant 
an area of land there. This might also happen if a clan was forced to relocate 
due to drought, disease, war or other catastrophe. Given the vast areas of land 
and the small population, the arrival of a new clan in a chiefdom tended to be 
beneficial to both parties. A new clan might be granted a tract of land by a 
chief within his domain, justifying his title of won lobo, ‘father of the land’. 
However, once this had happened, the clan would become responsible for 
internal land allocations, calling on the chief to mediate in cases of external 
disputes with another clan or chiefdom.
13 Girling, supra note 6, p. 100.
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Under colonialism, this system was subverted in numerous ways, including 
forced population movements, in particular from the west of Acholi near the 
Nile to along the new road north to Sudan. Girling often writes with a valedic-
tory tone about Acholi social organisation as he observed it in the early 1950s, 
20–30 years after this disruption occurred.14 However, while the picture of 
villages and their composition and association with clans is today extraordi-
narily complex in many places due to population movements since the 1920s, 
the tradition of mutable and mobile clans has apparently resulted in today’s 
Acholi villages manifesting a substantial degree of social continuity with their 
precursors. What does seem to have become more variable is the degree to 
which kinship plays a part in village organisation. Allen describes collective 
farming groups amongst the Acholi in southern Sudan in the 1980s, which 
ranged from single kinship groups to collections of kinships to seemingly 
non-kinship based groups including both Acholi and Madi people.15 lcmmt 
findings suggest a similarly complex pattern in contemporary Acholi, with 
some villages in which a single clan predominates, others that are far more 
mixed.
Colonial attempts to impose central authorities in Acholiland, and equiva-
lents of Western law and justice systems, seem to have largely revolved around 
individual appointments: no attempts to codify Acholi customary law, whether 
in relation to land or any other matters, appear to have been made during the 
Protectorate or indeed until very recently.16 Such factors impact the form and 
nature of land claims, land management and land dispute resolution for any 
customary land, and whether they evolve in the direction of codification. 
In Acholi, the principles of land custom and claims are, in their essence, 
negotiable.
14 Girling, supra note 6.
15 T. Allen, ‘Kwerte and Kwere: Acholi Farm Work Groups in Southern Sudan’, 3:2 Manchester 
Papers on Development (1987) pp. 60–92.
16 Girling, supra note 6, p. 85 recounts Postlethwaite, the first District Commissioner of 
Acholi recording Acholi customs “as I hear them”, but this remained unpublished; see also 
A. Macdonald, Justice in Transition? Transitional Justice and Its Discontents in Northern 
Uganda, (PhD Thesis, Kings College London, 2014). In 2008, the formally recognised cul-
tural leadership body, Ker Kwaro Acholi, representing the pre-colonial chiefdoms or 
domains, published Principles and Practices of Customary Tenure in Acholiland, [Acholi 
Luo version: Cik me loyoki kit me tic kingom kwaro iAcholi] (J. B. Enterprises, Gulu, 2008). 
This was followed by Law to Declare: the Acholi Customary Law (J.B. Enterprises, Gulu, 
2009).
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3 Findings
3.1 Mediation and Adjudication
The Land Conflict Monitoring and Mapping Tool identified a steep decline in 
numbers of land disputes across Acholi, with around 4,000 during the six-
month period October 2011 to March 2012 and just over 2,000 in the period 
April to September 2012; there were just over 1,000 current, on-going disputes 
in September 2012.
To the extent that individual dispute descriptions are representative, it is 
probable that there were about 200 (18 per cent of the total) ongoing parish-
level disputes involving women/female-headed households as principle par-
ties in September 2012 in Acholi. In 33 per cent of the disputes examined, the 
parties have a close family relationship, while a further 30 per cent are mem-
bers of the same extended family and 16 per cent members of the same sub-
clan or clan. Disputes involving a female headed household are substantially 
more likely than all disputes to be intra-family (63 per cent compared to 33 per 
cent).
Rates of dispute resolution were consistently high, with a majority being 
resolved within six months, implying that community level dispute resolution 
mechanisms are effective and becoming more so. It seems that the natural 
habitat of the land grabber, extensive in the chaos that ensued during and 
immediately after the return of the population from displacement camps – 
mainly between 2008 and 2010 – has shrunk considerably.17 Local Councils I 
(Village) and II (Parish) have to a large extent now become ‘embedded’ in 
Acholi:18 although for many years these entities were compromised by the war 
and ensuing antipathy between the National Resistance Movement (nrm) 
government and most Acholi. In fact, their grass-roots democratic nature reso-
nates strongly with Acholi traditions of decision-making in village meetings. 
Overlap of personnel and function between government and customary local 
management and justice administration has been a persistent feature.19
In 2013 the mandate of Parish Councils (lciis) to hold courts to adjudicate 
land disputes was withdrawn. The failure to hold Village Council and Parish 
Council elections since 2002, ostensibly due to lack of funds, had raised 
17 Hopwood and Atkinson, supra note 5.
18 H.E. Porter, ‘Justice and Rape on the Periphery: The Supremacy of Social Harmony in the 
Space Between Local Solutions and Formal Judicial Systems in Northern Uganda’, 6:1 
Journal of Eastern African Studies (2012) pp. 85–86.
19 C. Leys, Politicians and Policies: An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda, 1962–1965 (East 
African Publication House, Nairobi, 1967) pp. 19–21.
396 Hopwood
international journal on minority and group rights 22 (2015) 387-409
questions as to these bodies’ legitimacy. This was especially pertinent in 
respect of Parish Councils as dispensers of formal justice. In theory this has left 
a vast unfilled gap in the land dispute resolution process. In practice, however, 
the suspension of the supposed formal, adjudicative processes of Parish courts 
seem not to have interfered with what has long been a customary process of 
mediation by leaders involving communities. As one Parish councillor 
described a case to us, “[t]he dispute was resolved before the Parish Council, 
though it was not like a court ruling, but like mediation through mutual under-
standing of both parties and the community members”.20
In fact there are many reasons why community land dispute resolution 
may be effective: decisions made by individuals or small groups, whether of 
customary leaders or government at every level, that are suspect, being seen as 
corruptible. By contrast, communities working as large groups representing 
many interests and perspectives are (relatively) trusted. They also usually con-
tain participants with extensive knowledge of the individuals involved and of 
the land in question. A Parish Chairman, responsible for a formal court process 
until recently, nonetheless thought “there should be involvement and active 
participation to settle land disputes by youths, elders, women, clan leaders and 
religious leaders. And no courts or involvement of political leaders”.21
Moreover there are cultural issues with the whole concept of adjudication 
by leaders. In Acholi tradition and custom, this was not one of the functions of 
clan or chiefdom leaders, unless it was in a highly consultative and inclusive 
fashion. ‘Customary justice’, as introduced by colonial authorities, was, accord-
ing to Girling who observed it, far from customary, and frequently despotic.22 
Local justice, or perhaps ‘social ordering’ would be a better term, administered 
by appointed or elected functionaries, has continued in various forms – includ-
ing the current local council system – under the various governments of inde-
pendent Uganda. ‘Social ordering’ has tended to be variably based on custom 
in its identification of wrongdoing, process of decision-making, and ideas of 
appropriate resolutions, but obliquely and to a small degree on state law and 
notions of formal justice.23
20 lcii Councillor, Ongako, Gulu, February 2014.
21 lcii Chairman, Palabek Kal, Lamwo, August 2012.
22 Girling, supra note 6, p. 196.
23 B. Jones, Beyond the State in Rural Uganda (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009) 
p. 76; J. Hopwood, Elephants Abroad and in the Room: Explicit and Implicit Security, Justice 
and Protection Issues on the Uganda/South Sudan Border (London School of Economics 
and Political Science, London, 2015).
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Partly, this can be understood as a natural consequence of having justice 
administered by untrained, often uneducated community members. However, 
this is an important interface between not simply the particulars of state law 
and custom, but the very purposes of social ordering and the means by which 
it is undertaken. Holly Porter has observed and described the priority given to 
the maintenance of customarily appropriate social relations, over and above 
any conception of justice by legal process, by contemporary Acholis.24 Social 
harmony, as observed by Porter, is not inimical to ideas of justice, as retribution 
and/or reparations often figure. However, the needs of kinship groups to main-
tain or achieve harmonious relations seem to be the ultimate goal of interven-
tions after wrongdoing. Individual redress or avengement or the punishment 
of an individual tend to be side issues in a context where concepts of ‘victim’ 
and ‘perpetrator’ are attached to kinship groups rather than to individuals. 
Within clans and families, normative justice can be a minor concern relative to 
maintenance of appropriate relations.
The data discussed here seems to confirm this. Multiple responses referred 
to the necessity of parties reaching agreement or compromise in achieving a 
successful resolution. Especially in the case of intra-family or intra-clan dis-
putes, the issue was often not about who was in the right as much as what both 
parties could accept and agree to. As a respondent who was both a Parish 
Chairman and a clan elder told us, “[t]he case is between relatives and so the 
[Parish] court told them that they should come to an understanding between 
themselves, and that if a ruling has to be made then this will spoil their 
relationship”.25
Bringing two parties together in agreement may be a long process, but cus-
tom allows for patience and perseverance in such matters, even if today this 
may take the form of disputes being played out in a variety of different forums, 
as seen in the following case between a man and his brother’s widow:26
The dispute was resolved, though the mediation went through many 
steps. The first step was through the family members, but it failed, hence 
it was forwarded to the rwot kweri, but he also failed.27 The third mediation 
24 H. E. Porter, After Rape: Justice and Social Harmony in Northern Uganda (PhD Thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2013); Porter, supra note 18.
25 lcii Chairman and clan elder, Odek, Gulu, August 2012.
26 In this and all the following quotes, names of parties have been changed.
27 A rwot kweri (pl. rwodi kweri) is a ‘chief of the hoe’ elected by a community in a sub- 
division of a village to administer and oversee land organisation and collective farming. 
They are elected on the basis of their local land knowledge and community trust for an 
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was done by the lcii court, but it also failed then later it was forwarded 
to the sub-county court, though it as well failed. Lastly, Mrs Akello for-
warded the case to the high court and from there, the ruling was that 
since Mrs Akello was married into the family and because of the children, 
then she has the right to use the land. Hence she retained the land owner-
ship. Currently, Mr Ocen doesn’t disturb Mrs Akello because after the 
court ruling, they had a family meeting to advise Mr Ocen accordingly 
and traditionally. Mr Ocen has become the caretaker of Mrs Akello and 
her children, thus there isn’t any further dispute.28
Clearly taking a case like this through multiple forums has a cost, and is often 
dismissed as ‘forum-shopping’, indulged in by land grabbers, the opportunity 
for which is seen as a failing of current dispute resolution systems.29 Perhaps it 
is, but the above description obliquely iterates a further factor favouring, given 
the context, a system of community involvement, consensus around compro-
mise, and a goal of social harmony. This is that in practice, there are extremely 
rarely means for courts to enforce their decisions. In the above example, until 
Mr Ocen acknowledged that he was in the wrong, none of the bodies that had 
found against him were in a position to oblige him to return the land to his 
brother’s widow, Mrs Akello, including the magistrate’s court. In the end this 
was achieved not by the court, nor any part of the justice, law and order sector, 
but by a family meeting, presumably strengthened since its first attempt at 
mediation through corroboration by all the subsequently involved bodies.
Due to the lack of enforcement resources, actual outcomes of formal pro-
cesses tend to reflect the power, physical, political or economic, of the parties. 
Where a court ruling is rejected by the losing party and needs to be physically 
enforced, this requires mobilisation of court brokers and/or the police, usually 
only options for the rich. It is hence very common for land dispute cases 
‘resolved’ by formal courts to persist. However, as the problem of corruption in 
the courts is endemic, this may not reflect injustice. In the following example, 
there is no information as to who has the stronger moral and customary claim 
to the land. It is implied, however that Mrs Ajok is only able to pursue and 
probably win the case due to her access to money through her expatriate 
children:
indefinite period and are usually one of the first lines of mediation in local land disputes. 
See Porter, supra note 24, pp. 113–115; Hopwood and Atkinson, supra note 5, p. 27.
28 lcii Councillor, Odek, Gulu, February 2014.
29 C. Burke and E.O. Egaru, Identification of Good Practices in Land Conflict Resolution in 
Acholi (United Nations Peacebuilding Programme, Kampala, 2011) p. 9.
 399Women’s Land Claims in the Acholi Region of Northern Uganda
international journal on minority and group rights 22 (2015) 387-409
The dispute has not yet ended because Mrs Ajok has forwarded the case 
to the magistrates court. Olanya Dennis and five other households are 
still living and using the land. Initially, Mrs Ajok had Olanya Dennis 
arrested, but the family members came together with the other five 
households and made the police release him, and on return they vowed 
to continue living there and using the land. Currently, Olanya Dennis and 
the other five households are still living on and farming the land, and 
they say Ajok will never make them to become her slaves even though she 
believes in the power of the wealth of her children who are based in the 
United Kingdom.30
Not only are security systems inadequate to enforce court decisions, they are 
unable to enforce compliance with procedure, or even to protect adjudicators, 
as in this example:
When Mrs Legum forwarded the case to the lcii [Parish] court, 
Mr Kilama never turned up, but he sent information to the lcii [Parish 
Chairman] that if he doesn’t want to be killed, he shouldn’t go to the land 
to mediate, thus he never went because of fear. Later, because the lcii 
didn’t mediate the dispute, Mrs Legum decided to forward the case to the 
sub-county, though it was not tried since Kilama again failed to attend. 
His deliberate failures to attend and the threats he makes show clearly 
that the land doesn’t belong to him, but to Mrs Legum. Currently the case 
has been forwarded to the office of the rdc though it hasn’t yet been 
dealt with, since the rdc has been transferred to another district.31  
Mrs Legum is now frustrated and Kilama is continuing to use the land as 
his and there isn’t any authority to help her.32
The reluctance on occasion of elders and lower courts to make judgements, 
combined with the fear of corruption in both government and customary bod-
ies, were among the reasons given by some respondents to advocate for civil 
society involvement.33 One respondent stated that “land wrangles should be 
30 lcii Councillor, Bungatira, Gulu, February 2014.
31 ‘rdc’ refers to the Resident District Commissioner – a Presidential appointee with 
responsibility for security in a district.
32 lcii Councillor, Awach, Gulu, September 2012.
33 See Peace, Recovery and Development Plan 2, <www.prdp.org.ug/>, visited on 9 June 2015. 
Under one strategic objective (SO4) of the second phase of the second Peace, Recovery 
and Development Plan (prdp ii) for Uganda’s conflict-affected northern and eastern 
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handled by independent bodies like non-governmental organizations (ngos) 
because the rich people are always winning cases because of the prevailing 
corruption in Uganda. In some places, elders from the office of the chief are 
using their power to take land from people and then rent it out”.34 While a 
number of respondents argued that ngos should become actively involved in 
dispute resolution, there seem to have been few instances where this has taken 
place, and in the one instance where ngo involvement was described in some 
detail, the outcome was unsatisfactory, not least due to a disturbing suggestion 
that the ngo adopted a partisan and even juridical role:
The case was not settled since Mrs Lakica rejected the mediation by the 
lcii and the rwot kweri by refusing to sign the acceptance letter, though 
her children signed. However, Mrs Lakica forwarded the case to 
Norwegian Refugee Council and their mediation and ruling favoured Mrs 
Lakica. This raised the anger of the community about the negative ruling 
against Ogen. After that, Ogen filed the case in the high court, but it has 
not yet been ruled … Though the Norwegian Refugee Council ruled 
against Ogen, the community made it a point that neither party should 
use the land, nor anyone else from the community, as they wait for the 
ruling from the high court.35
Other respondents saw the appropriate role of civil society as boosting the 
skills, confidence and legitimacy of community dispute resolution actors. As 
one respondent recommended:
My advice is that if at all there is any ngo that can provide civic educa-
tion to the mediators from within the local communities, so that they 
have respect, then this would reduce the level of land disputes, which can 
even lead to killings. Secondly, the courts should be prohibited because it 
is these very courts that do not rule appropriately due to bribery, making 
poor people lose their land.36
It is impossible to define what constitutes an acceptable level of disputes, though 
it is unreasonable to expect that there will be none at all. These respondents, in 
districts, Alternative Dispute Resolution, ‘adr’, is now a key element for donors’ access to 
justice programmes. It involves trainings and manuals.
34 Human Rights Volunteer, Anaka, Nwoya, February 2012.
35 lcii Councillor/paralegal volunteer, Labongo Layamo, Kitgum, February 2014.
36 Chairperson, Parish Development Committee, Angagura, Pader, February 2014.
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the front line of serious dispute resolution, did not complain of being over-
whelmed by numbers of disputes, but rather of the difficulties inherent: lack of 
means of enforcing rulings, lack of confidence that they were doing the right 
thing and personal and community risks. For example, 26 per cent of disputes 
where one or both parties were women involved violence, while 13 disputes 
(six per cent) involved a total of 21 killings. These figures are comparable to 
levels of violence and murder in all reported disputes. While disturbing, even 
these figures need to be considered in relation to high levels of violence and 
murder in contemporary Ugandan society.
The above findings are of a pattern of dispute resolution through mediation 
seeking compromise in pursuit of social harmony; lower level state actors actu-
ally function as embedded community actors, while higher levels of the jus-
tice, law and order sector sometimes play a role, but rarely a decisive one. 
Though these findings are not specific to women as principle parties to land 
disputes, they are highly relevant to issues of women’s land security. The 
 following sections relate more specifically to what is contested by women, and 
how custom is responding to current issues.
3.2 Cognate Land Claims
An Acholi woman marries into a different clan, and on completion of the mar-
riage rituals and payments of bride price, she acquires a status within her hus-
band’s clan, with associated claims to land access. Bride price is seen as a 
resource for the recipient family to in turn fund the marriages of their sons, 
and in particular the brothers of the bride; thus the wealth circulates through-
out the region, cementing alliances between different clans. If her husband 
dies, traditionally a widow will be ‘inherited’ by one of her brothers-in-law in a 
levirate marriage. Should a marriage break down, both families will seek to 
reconcile them together, but if it is concluded that the husband’s behaviour is 
intolerable, the wife will return to her birth clan and, depending on the cir-
cumstances, the bride price may become repayable.37
These practices have changed in a number of ways, to an extent resulting 
from the extreme poverty and the social disruption caused by displacement 
over the period since 1995 (and perhaps earlier, as the Acholi lost their cattle, 
which represented most of their disposable wealth, in the late 1980s), but also 
by changing demographics and aids. Displacement affected clan cohesion, 
and responsibility for raising money for the bride price has latterly fallen to 
37 See Porter, supra note 24 for a detailed description of Acholi marriage.
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immediate families rather than being spread more broadly.38 In the idp camps, 
families had few if any resources in a context where they were dependent on 
food aid supplemented by what little they could grow on rented land around 
the camps. Any surpluses tended to get spent on health care or school costs in 
well-functioning families, or on alcohol in very many others. Child-headed 
households, where both parents had died through the war or from road acci-
dents or aids or other diseases, and where the extended family was unable or 
unwilling to provide for their orphans became common.
As they grew up, young people, whether orphaned or not but almost all 
without resources, sought partners. Fathers and brothers of girls took a range 
of attitudes to their ‘husbands’, some foregoing any great expectation of bride 
price, others recognising that the full amount could not be paid quickly, but 
maintaining pressure for gradual instalments. Rather than reducing the 
amounts involved, poverty seems to have inflated the expectations of brides’ 
families.
Whether or not the men and their families are being pressured for bride 
price, its non- or partial payment results in couples being in a state of marital 
limbo.39 These and other factors have resulted in massive levels of marital insta-
bility, leading to very many young women caring for children alone, or living 
with men who are not the fathers of their children. In the context of customary 
land claims, this has created much confusion. While separation and divorce 
were not unknown, they seem to have been quite rare in pre-displacement 
Acholi, approached on a case-by-case basis by the clans involved. Today they 
are extremely common.
The traditional option for rural women who separate from their husbands is 
to return to their paternal clan, but their land access there is frequently chal-
lenged. One sub-county court member told us, “the major cause of land dis-
putes are girls who marry, but then go back to their paternal homes with 
children, and later the children begin claiming land ownership”.40
Traditionally, besides bride price for the woman, the husband’s clan would 
also have made various payments (luk) for children born of the union.41 Where 
38 Girling, supra note 6, p. 39 reports the clan of the husband’s mother frequently contribut-
ing to bride price, although primary responsibility lay with the clan of the husband’s 
father.
39 Even where bride price has been paid, few couples take the further step of registering 
their marriage. As a result most land, property and inheritance law relating to wives and 
widows does not apply to the overwhelming majority of women.
40 lciii Court Committee member, Labongo, Kitgum, August 2012.
41 Porter, supra note 24, pp. 191–194.
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luk has been paid, in the event of separation children would stay with the 
mother until the age of seven; thereafter they would return to the father as 
members of his clan, with attendant inheritance and land rights. Where, as is 
now often the case, luk has not been paid, or where the father’s family lack the 
will or resources to care for the children, problems occur. While there seems to 
be a general tendency to accept divorced women back into their paternal 
homes, how strong their land claims are, and the status of their children (in 
particular, whether they have claims to inherit), are widely contested by male 
family members, and this seems to represent an area where custom is evolving, 
with elders and communities tending to support such women’s claims, and 
sometimes, their children’s. Girling and Finnström noted that strong ties 
between children and their mother’s clan and particularly her brother’s clan 
increased chances of acceptance back into maternal homes. It seems that the 
maternal clan is still seen as a refuge for individuals of both sexes, and some-
times as a source of inheritable land, as in the instance below.42
This land was given by a mother called Helen to her daughter Barbara in 
1971. In 2011 Ogen [Barbara’s nephew] started claiming that the land 
belonged to him, so he decided to chase Barbara away, saying that a 
woman has no rights to own land. After the case was settled [in favour of 
Barbara], Ogen rejected the decision, yet all the community members 
were supporting Barbara.43
Where a woman never married, her claims to her father’s clan land seem 
strong, if still contested on occasion: “It was clearly stated by the clan elders 
that the land belongs to Susan because it was given to her by her brother, so 
how can [her nephew] Okema claim the land from his aunt who was not mar-
ried in another clan?”44
3.3 Marital Land Claims
Attempts by their in-laws to evict widows from the land they occupied with 
their late husbands is a common phenomenon. About 30 per cent of the 
reported disputes involving a female party involve a brother-in-law or other 
male relative seeking to evict a widow from her land.
42 Girling, supra note 6, pp. 39–40; S. Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History 
and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda, (Duke University Press, Durham, North 
Carolina, 2008) p. 34.
43 lcii Chairman, Pajule, Pader, August 2012.
44 lciii Chairman, Lataya, Pader, August 2012.
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Traditionally a widow was inherited as a wife by one of her brothers-in-
law, and it seems that this sometimes still happens, although much more rarely 
following the aids pandemic. Any children of the union are part of the hus-
band’s clan and the responsibility of their paternal uncles. If still children, they 
remain under the care of their mother who holds their share of land in trust for 
them. If adults, they become protectors of their mother if widow inheritance 
does not take place.
In almost all of the resolved disputes involving widows, their claims were 
successful. Where such disputes remained unresolved, it was usually because 
the male challenger refused to accept the ruling of whatever process had trans-
pired; usually these hard-to-resolve cases are presented as more or less overt 
instances of culpable land grabbing. However in many cases the losing party 
would seem to eventually accept the outcome of mediation and family har-
mony is restored.
Why this pattern of male family heads seeking to evict women, whether 
born or married into the clan, is so common probably varies with different 
land management models and pressures. In some instances where land is com-
moditised, it may be a case of opportunistic greed. In other cases population 
pressures may be the issue. Whether control of clan land is exercised by clan 
leaders or by family heads seems to vary significantly across Acholi. Where par-
cels of land are specific to families and in short supply, problems arise. In such 
cases, allotting land for all entitled family members falls to the family head, 
even if the land is ultimately under the control of the clan. Where there is an 
actual or feared future land shortage for that family, the head will attempt to 
diminish the number of claimants, favouring male clan members with the 
most overt traditional claims. Clan elders on the other hand are, it would seem, 
more concerned with the interests and obligations of the clan as a whole to its 
individual members. Thus women are able to retain their land access when 
this is threatened by heads of families, by appealing to the clan elders. This 
would seem to be supported by consideration of lcmmt data from across 
Acholi. Where land was reported to be under the control of the whole clan, 
intra-clan disputes seemed to be much less likely to occur.45
3.4 Women, Guests and the Informal Land Market
While the above findings suggest that women are successfully establishing 
their claims to both patrilineal and marital clan land, many others of both 
genders are being forced off land, or are increasingly vulnerable, through 
weaker associations with the dominant clans. These ‘guests’ are people who 
45 Hopwood and Atkinson, supra note 5.
 405Women’s Land Claims in the Acholi Region of Northern Uganda
international journal on minority and group rights 22 (2015) 387-409
have been given land by members of the dominant clan or who have inherited 
such gifted land. Land is traditionally given to friends, and relations by mar-
riage, without the terms being spelled out, let alone documented. Historically 
and traditionally, the typical terms would be that: 1) guests are there at the 
discretion of the gifting clan, and that the gifting clan may reclaim the plot, 
given cause; 2) the size of the plot of land in question is fixed and cannot be 
expanded without the permission of the gifting clan; 3) the plot can be passed 
on to the guest’s heirs and that the gift is potentially indefinite; and 4) remain-
ing on the land is conditional on the guests being good neighbours and adopt-
ing clan mores.
However, as such terms are not written, they are open to widely differing 
interpretations. Over the course of a couple of generations, guests who were 
liked may be admitted into the host clan. In the past, if they were told to vacate 
the land for whatever reason, guests would usually have had other options – 
returning to their clan of origin or seeking out another in-law clan. Today land 
pressures mean that this is likely to be much more difficult – many clans will 
be resistant to new inward migration rather than welcoming.
All of the above needs to be understood in terms of negotiability. Guests do 
not have rights to land in the Western sense (it is arguable that no one does), 
though they have claims through having developed land or through having 
buried their forebears there. In practice, guests may be central to a clan com-
munity. It is often generally forgotten who is and who is not a guest, and there 
are instances of elderly land grabbers inventing false genealogies to claim that 
certain clan members are in fact guests. On the other hand, problems with 
guests often arise through them selling, or trying to sell, land. Guests may be 
more prone to trying to sell land because they have less attachment to it, but 
perhaps also because they feel less secure and are trying to monetise their 
principal asset before it is taken from them.
Gifting of land can be seen as the precursor of the informal land market as 
it has emerged. While small parcels of land have been traded and formally ten-
ured in the main towns, Gulu and Kitgum, for nearly a century, in rural areas 
the norm was for communities to gift land not only to guests, but also to 
churches, hospitals, schools, health centres, local government and other insti-
tutions for community benefit. However, the terms of such gifts tend to be as 
unspecific and undocumented as those to individuals. Acholi are widely famil-
iar with a certain notion of land as a marketable asset due to the almost univer-
sal practice of renting small plots for farming in the vicinity of idp camps, to 
supplement inadequate food rations. While this has introduced the notion of 
renting and of the ‘paying guest’ it has still left the notion of a permanent sale 
obscure to many. Where the relationship to land is ontological, as described by 
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Okoth-Ogendo, permanent alienation may be hard to conceptualise.46 It is 
extremely common for land sales – and of land gifts to institutions that the 
latter assumed were permanent – to end in dispute, sometimes with the origi-
nal vendors or gifters, often with their heirs.
The most obvious problem with trading clan land is that the negotiability of 
rights or claims to the land means that it is often extremely difficult to say who 
all the ‘owners’ are. In more traditional villages, an individual or family does 
not have permanent control over a specific parcel of land or a given amount of 
farmland (although might make a permanent claim to a small homestead). On 
the basis of this, it is often argued that clan land is inalienable and that the 
informal market in customary land is inherently immoral and/or illegal. As 
Chimhowu and Woodhouse explain, even where customary land is recognised 
in law, in the absence of formal registration of land there perhaps cannot be a 
legal customary land market.47 This is not, however, an argument for formalis-
ing or titling customary land, as the hazards of the land market, formal or 
informal, for very poor people in places where there are neither jobs or safety 
nets, are massive. In such a market, distress sales are likely to predominate 
leading to landlessness and extreme poverty.48
One of the arguments made in favour of informal land markets is their 
potential to offset women’s disadvantages under customary tenure – if they are 
deprived of land access by patriarchal and discriminatory customary authori-
ties, they can gain land access by renting or buying.49 While few women are 
able to afford to buy land – even where this can be made to work – very many 
Acholi women (and some men) rent plots to farm on, often as a supplement to 
day labouring or petty business. In this context, the market in rented land is an 
essential element of survival for many. Buying and selling is a different matter. 
Land transactions frequently don’t work, perhaps because the concept of fixed 
46 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Legislative approaches to customary tenure and tenure reform 
in East Africa’, in C. Toulmin and J. Quan (eds.), Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in 
Africa (Department for International Development, International Institute for Environ-
ment and Development, University of Greenwich National Resources Institute, London, 
2000) pp. 123–34.
47 See A. Chimhowu and P. Woodhouse, ‘Customary vs. Private Property Rights? Dynamics 
and Trajectories of Vernacular Land Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa’, 6:3 Journal of 
Agrarian Change (2006) pp. 346–371 for a comprehensive account of this debate.
48 Ibid., p. 347.
49 S.O. Okuro, ‘Struggling with In-Laws and Corruption in Kombewa Division, Kenya: The 
Impact of hiv/aids on Widows’ and Orphans’ Land Rights’, in B. Englert and E. Daly 
(eds.) Women’s Land Rights and Privatization in Eastern Africa (Fountain Publishers, 
Kampala, 2008) pp. 132–135.
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plots of land functioning as commodities, and in which a sale is a final event, 
doesn’t resonate with most people. Sellers often seem to assume it is a tem-
porary deal – something like a short lease – and that they have the power to 
change the terms or revoke the sale at any time should they choose, as in 
this case:
The fact is that Okello bought land from Pauline’s late husband in 1994, 
and recently Okello wanted to sell part of the land; but Pauline was of the 
view of stopping Okello so as to gain much more from the land by selling 
it to another person. Pauline’s argument was that Okello bought the land 
cheaply from her late husband, yet the land is big, so her reasoning was 
that Okello should not sell the whole land because part of the land still 
belongs to her. Later, when Okello produced the sale agreement which 
contained the sketch map of the land, it was clearly resolved that the land 
belongs to Okello because she had also signed the sale agreement.50
As things currently stand, whether a land transaction is conclusive or not, and 
what has been sold, is a matter of (contemporary) custom; whether or not local 
authorities have an interest in maintaining a ‘fair’ market, or the ability to 
influence it if they do, is a very local matter.
4 Conclusions
Overall these findings suggest that land dispute resolution actors are providing 
a substantial degree of land access security to rural Acholis, including women. 
It would be wrong to idealise them, however, because by their own account, 
there are many cases where parish-level leaders are unable to protect vulnera-
ble people, and even themselves, from elite and/or moneyed land grabbers, as 
well as, sometimes, from aggrieved parties. Others, including women, are 
unfairly denied access to land, but are constrained in a host of ways from pur-
suing a complaint even at the most local level. There are ‘guests’ who have been 
evicted, or whose security on land they have occupied for generations is threat-
ened, due to the nature of custom as it is currently understood and applied.
State actors in the shape of Village and Parish Councils play a central role in 
customary land administration. However the role played by the state qua state 
is seemingly very small: Village and Parish Councils are playing community 
and customary roles that have little to do with their formal functions. Perhaps 
50 lcii Councillor, Ongako, Gulu, February 2014.
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this is a position they adopt to gain community approval, but it is more prob-
able that this is the de facto role allocated to them by a state with little interest 
in intervening, beyond protecting its own security interests, at a local level.
The ‘law’ that local council uphold is that of custom; their methods are 
mediation rather than adjudication; their goal is social harmony rather than 
justice; and their enforcement resources are social pressure and community 
action rather than the police or higher courts. The justice, law and order sector 
is not completely absent, but in very few of the 202 reported cases here exam-
ined did it have a conclusive role in dispute resolution: sub-county and magis-
trates courts are periodically involved, but rarely decisively, often referring 
issues back to community leaders on the basis that they lack the information 
to make an informed judgement, at other times making rulings that they are 
unable to enforce. Ben Jones has argued that state services in relation to land, 
including the police and the higher courts, are of marginal functionality and 
relevance in rural Uganda.51 lcmmt findings likewise suggest that the kinds of 
intra-family or intra-clan disputes that women find themselves party to do not 
attract much state attention.
Almost all of the instances noted in the findings above give a picture of cus-
tomary land principles and dispute resolution methods as negotiable, and 
undertaken in the cause of something that might be termed social harmony, 
rather than justice as a legal process. This challenges those understandings of 
customary ‘law’ and ‘land rights’ that have been in currency since the start of 
the colonial era, namely that these are directly comparable to Western law and 
Western rights and hence can be codified and incorporated into the formal 
justice system.52 These findings suggest that customary dispute resolution sys-
tems work on the basis of loose principles and overlapping claims that cannot 
be translated into ‘law’ and ‘rights’, at least not without dispossessing large 
numbers of people of their land access.
Land law reform might potentially improve land access security for some by 
influencing custom to give greater normative weight to the claims of women, 
but there are other, probably more effective, means by which this might be 
undertaken. Law reform carries many risks, including that of shrinking or 
51 Jones, supra note 23, p. 164.
52 Not that codification was attempted in the case of Acholi (see supra note 16). Throughout 
Uganda and much of the British Empire, bifurcated legal systems – ‘formal’ and ‘custom-
ary’ – were adopted by colonial governments ostensibly as culturally responsive solu-
tions, especially in situations of indirect rule. In practice, ‘customary law’ absolved the 
ruling power of a great deal of administrative complication and expense, which may also 
explain why it has persisted in much of post-colonial Africa.
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undermining the space in which customary land management now operates. 
This is dangerous as the formal state is not at this time able to fill any such 
space created. Perhaps the most practical intervention to strengthen land 
security for women is by responding to the local leaders who provided the 
information for this study, who often asked for help, which in the spirit of cus-
tomary practice might take the form of dialogue on how to address new 
challenges.
This study identifies a situation in which customary communal land pro-
cesses in Acholi are providing a degree of security for women within the cus-
tomary system, with claims based on heredity seemingly having evolved as 
stronger, in the eyes of communities, than in the past. There is no obvious 
means suggested in these findings whereby the state, as it is now or in the fore-
seeable future, could offer greater or even equivalent protection, whether 
through law reform, formal titling or otherwise.
